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DETERMINING THE RETROACTIVE EFFECT
OF LAWS ALTERING THE CONSEQUENCES
OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
Nancy Morawetz*
INTRODUCTION
It has long been established that legislatures can pass laws that
limit a person's rights based on past criminal convictions.' In
Hawker v. People of New York,2 the United States Supreme Court
held that there was no ex post facto problem when a state statute
prohibited the practice of medicine by a person with a past convic-
tion, even though this consequence was not contemplated at the
time of the conviction. In subsequent cases, the Court has made
clear that other after-the-fact consequences, including mandatory
deportation, present no ex post facto problem. 3 Although there
are arguments that due process might nonetheless curb extreme
uses of this legislative power, the constitutional landscape for liti-
gation is constrained.4
At the same time, statutory arguments against retroactive appli-
cation of new consequences of criminal convictions have become
more robust. Despite the fact that immigration consequences are
* Professor of Clinical Law, New York University School of Law. In addition to
writing about these issues, the Author has participated in some of the litigation de-
scribed in this Article, including arguing Domond v. I.N.S., 244 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2001),
and participating in the briefing before the Supreme Court in I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533
U.S. 289 (2001). This Article benefited from conversations over the years with many
people, especially Manny Vargas and Christopher Meade. The Author gratefully ac-
knowledges the financial support of the Filomeno D'Agostino Greenberg Research
Fund and the excellent research assistance of Shannon McKinnon.
1. See, e.g., Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 608-09 (1913) (upholding a law
that provided for the deportation of a women convicted of prostitution); Hawker v.
New York, 170 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1898) (upholding a public health law which prohib-
ited a person convicted of a felony from practicing medicine).
2. 170 U.S. at 191-92.
3. See, e.g., Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955); Bugajewitz, 228 U.S. at
592.
4. See Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment. Some
Thoughts About Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1889, 1929-31
(2000); Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Pro-
cess Clause, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 131-34 (1998) (discussing substantive due process
challenges to retroactive deportation laws); Robert Pauw, A New Look at Deporta-
tion as Punishment: Why at Least Some of the Constitution's Criminal Procedure Pro-
tections Must Apply, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 305, 310-13 (2000).
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widely treated as "collateral" to a conviction,5 the Supreme Court's
2001 decision in IN.S. v. St. Cyr 6 recognized that changes in the
immigration consequences of a conviction can constitute a "new
legal consequence" that cannot be imposed retroactively without
clear congressional intent.7 St. Cyr represents a major potential
tool in protecting the rights of persons convicted of crimes from
onerous new civil consequences.
St. Cyr leaves open many issues that will determine how power-
ful the decision will actually prove to be in practice. One of those
issues is the core question of the date against which new legal con-
sequences are measured.8 Although it is well established in crimi-
nal law that retroactive effect is measured from the date of criminal
conduct,9 many courts have drawn a very different lesson from the
Supreme Court's decision in St. Cyr. These courts have concluded
that, for a new law to have a retroactive effect on those with past
convictions, the conviction must arise from a plea, and the plea
agreement must have predated the change in the laws." This rule
has led to many anomalous results, such as permitting new civil
consequences based on past convictions for those who took their
cases to trial years before a change in the law."
This Article traces the roots of the current emphasis on plea
agreements 12 to confusion about indicia of retroactivity in cases in-
volving quasi-economic transactions13 and those involving laws that
5. See, e.g., People v. Ford, 657 N.E.2d 265, 268 (N.Y. 1995) (treating immigra-
tion consequences of convictions as "collateral" and concluding that a criminal courtjudge need not advise defendant of such consequences prior to accepting plea).
6. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
7. Id. at 321.
8. Id. at 318-19.
9. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701-02 (2000) (applying the
"clear statement" rule to conclude that a change in the terms of supervised release
does not apply to cases in which the initial offense is before the effective date of the
new law); Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 435-36 (1987) (applying Ex Post Facto
Clause to conclude that a change in sentencing guidelines does not apply to those
whose crimes occurred prior to the new guidelines).
10. See Dias v. I.N.S., 311 F.3d 456, 458 (1st Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Chambers v.
Reno, 307 F.3d 284, 290-91 (4th Cir. 2002); Perez v. Elwood, 294 F.3d 552, 559-60 (3d
Cir. 2002); Armendariz-Montoya v. Sonchik, 291 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002);
Domond v. I.N.S., 244 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2001); DiSanto v. I.N.S., No. Civ. 4239,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21763, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 31, 2001); Lawrence v. I.N.S., No.
Civ. 2154, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10058, at *7-*9 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2001), affd sub.
nom, Rankine v. Reno, 319 F.3d 93, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2003).
11. Chambers, 307 F.3d at 294-95, 298 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
12. See infra text accompanying notes 23-32.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 56-67.
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are targeted at wrongful conduct. 4 Although economic transac-
tions are properly evaluated in terms of standards such as reliance,
reliance has no proper application with respect to laws that govern
wrongful conduct. Instead, when wrongful conduct is at issue, the
proper question is whether the person had fair notice of the degree
of consequences.
I. THE ROOTS OF A PLEA-BASED STANDARD
OF RETROACTIVITY
At the heart of retroactivity case law is the question whether a
law has a retroactive effect. 15 Without a retroactive effect, the law
does not trigger any special form of scrutiny under either statutory
or constitutional principles. 6 If there is a retroactive effect, how-
ever, the law will not be read as applying in a retroactive manner
absent a clear expression of legislative intent to apply the law in
that manner.' 7 In addition, only a retroactive effect will trigger per
se bar imposed by the Ex Post Facto Clause or require seperate
justification under the Due Process Clause.'8
Recent case law developments exploring the retroactive effect of
changes in the immigration consequences of convictions began by
asking the question whether a "collateral" consequence, such as
being excluded from relief from deportation, could also be consid-
ered a new legal consequence of any past criminal act.19 In a series
of cases decided after the 1990 revisions to the immigration laws,
many courts concluded that there was no retroactive effect from
new laws that eliminated the right to a discretionary relief hearing
prior to deportation.2 ° These courts found that people who were
deportable suffered no new legal consequence by the change in the
14. See infra text accompanying notes 70-82.
15. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321 (2001).
16. Id. at 316-17.
17. Id. at 321; Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939,
939-40 (1997); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 294-96 (1994).
18. The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive penal laws. See, e.g., Miller v.
Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 428-29 (1987) (reversing increased sentencing of defendant be-
cause application of new sentencing guidelines violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution). In analyzing the Due Process Clause, courts will apply separate
scrutiny to a legislative decision to apply a law retroactively. See Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984); see also Morawetz, supra
note 4, at 131-34.
19. See Scheidemann v. I.N.S., 83 F.3d 1517, 1521 (3d Cir. 1996); De Osorio v.
I.N.S., 10 F.3d 1034, 1042 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that Congress has the authority to
attach present immigration consequences to past activity).
20. See Scheidemann, 83 F.3d at 1523, 1525 (stating that statutory provisions did
not have a retroactive effect).
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law."' They had been and remained deportable. The practical fact
that they were denied any chance to remain through a showing of
specific equities was treated as irrelevant.22
After Congress imposed more sweeping mandatory deportation
laws in 1996,23 courts faced a second wave of litigation. This time,
retroactivity arguments received a more welcome reception in the
courts. Ultimately, this litigation led to the Supreme Court's ruling
in LN.S. v. St. Cyr, where the Court concluded that a law has a
retroactive effect if a past plea agreement mandates the deporta-
tion of a lawful permanent resident who previously was eligible for
relief from deportation.24
The facts of St. Cyr, like the facts of most of the cases litigated in
the aftermath of the 1996 laws, presented the Court with a person
who had pled guilty to a crime at a time when the immigration
consequences did not include mandatory deportation. Thus, his
case did not require the Court to take a position on what date con-
stituted a proper date for finding a retroactive effect.26 Indeed, St.
Cyr's lawyers side-stepped this issue in their briefs, and instead
suggested that under a variety of dates, including the date of the
criminal conduct, the date of the plea or the date of the conviction,
St. Cyr would have faced a retroactive change in consequences.27
They noted that it was not unprecedented for the Court to rule on
an issue of retroactivity without choosing a specific date;28 indeed,
the Court had done so just four years earlier in another retroactiv-
ity case. 9
21. Id. at 1523 (explaining that the consequences of petitioner's conduct were
clear at the time of the conduct).
22. Id.; see De Osorio, 10 F.3d at 1042.
23. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996); see Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-46 (1996) (repealing discretion-
ary relief under section 212 (c) of the Immigration and Naturalization Act); see also
Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of
Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1938-55 (2000) (describing the scope of
the laws).
24. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 290 (2001).
25. Id. at 293 (pleading guilty to sale of controlled substance).
26. Id.
27. See Respondent's Brief at 44, I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (No. 00-
767) ("[W]hether the relevant event is considered the criminal conduct, the plea, or
the conviction, all of the relevant events occurred for this respondent prior to the
enactment of the new law.").
28. Id. at 43-44.
29. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 946-47
(1997) (referring to conduct only as occurring "prior" to effective date of the statute).
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Because the St. Cyr litigation proceeded without a specific the-
ory of the proper date for judging retroactive effect, St. Cyr was
able to draw on retroactivity jurisprudence from a variety of con-
texts to support the claim that he had been subjected to retroactive
consequences. 30 Similarly, the Court's opinion drew from a variety
of strands of retroactivity jurisprudence to support its decision.31
What remains unclear is whether all of these strands must coalesce
in a single case in order to find a retroactive effect.
Parts of the St. Cyr decision draw directly on the specific transac-
tion that constitutes the plea agreement.32 The Court noted that
plea agreements constitute a "quid pro quo" between the criminal
defendant and the government.33 The Court further found that it
was reasonable to believe that immigrants consciously relied on the
expectation of eligibility when they made decisions to plead
guilty.34 Throughout the opinion, the Court repeatedly uses the
term "reliance" to underscore the degree to which a specific trans-
action-namely the plea-was premised on expectations about
whether that plea would lead to automatic deportation.
Other parts of the St. Cyr decision look to a more expansive con-
cept of retroactivity. 36 The Court discusses several concepts other
than reasonable reliance as standards for evaluating retroactivity.
It specifically speaks of the need for "fair notice" and a respect for
30. St. Cyr's brief relied on ex post facto cases to explain why St. Cyr had suffered
a retroactive effect. Respondent's Brief at 44, St. Cyr (No. 00-767). In these cases,
the relevant date is the date of conduct. It also relied on cases that referenced the
specific deals made in plea negotiations. Id. at 38-39. In addition, it provided exam-
ples where fair warning could have made a difference, even in the absence of a quid
pro quo arrangement. Id. at 40 (citing Slusser v. Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n, 210 F.3d 783, 786 (7th Cir. 2000), for how the knowledge of consequences
can affect the financing of a defense).
31. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 314-26 (2001) (reviewing multiple analyses of
retroactivity to find statute should not apply here).
32. See id. at 321-23 (explaining the significance of plea agreements to retroactiv-
ity analysis).
33. Id. at 321.
34. Id. at 322-23.
35. Id. at 321-23. The Court noted that there could be "people who entered into
plea agreements with the expectation that they would be eligible for relief." Id. at
321. Moreover, the Court stated: "In exchange for some perceived benefit, defend-
ants waive several of their constitutional rights ... and grant the government numer-
ous 'tangible benefits."' Id. at 323 (quoting Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386,
393 n.3 (1987)). The Court further noted that: "preserving the possibility of such re-
lief [from deportation] would have been one of the principal benefits sought by de-
fendants." Id. Finally, the Court emphasizes that a contrary ruling "would
retroactively unsettle [alien defendants'] reliance on the state of the law at the time of
their plea agreement." Id. at 325 n.55.
36. See id. at 315-21.
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"settled expectations. ' 37 In addition, it underscores that there is no
single formula for evaluating retroactive effect.38 The Court pro-
ceeds to draw directly from cases that determined retroactive effect
in the criminal context-a context where reasonable reliance has
never been a key test.39 Ultimately, the Court issued a decision
where the holding was limited to persons who had entered plea
agreements.4 ° In contrast to the opinion of the Second Circuit,
which it was reviewing,41 the Supreme Court did not explicitly ad-
dress the issue whether this was the only set of persons who would
suffer an improper retroactive effect as a result of application of
the new mandatory deportation rules.4 2
In the wake of St. Cyr, courts have faced the question whether
the retroactive effect of the 1996 laws extends to those who did not
enter a plea prior to the change in the law.43 In general, courts
have largely restricted the application of St. Cyr to those who en-
tered pleas under the prior legal regime.4 4 Despite a few thought-
ful dissenting voices, the trend has been to limit St. Cyr to its
facts.4a
Behind judicial skepticism about retroactivity claims by those
without plea agreements is a narrative presented in one of the early
cases on the 1996 laws. In LaGuerre v. Reno, the Seventh Circuit
considered the case of a person, like St. Cyr, whose conduct, plea,
and conviction pre-dated the changes in the law.46 Writing for the
panel, Judge Posner said:
It would border on the absurd to argue that these aliens might
have decided not to commit drug crimes, or might have resisted
37. Id. at 323 (quoting Landgrad v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 255 (1994)).
38. See id. at 321 n.46.
39. Id. at 322-23.
40. Id. at 326.
41. St. Cyr v. I.N.S., 229 F.3d 406, 418 (2d Cir. 2000).
42. See St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326.
43. See infra text accompanying notes 47-53.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 47-53.
45. Judge Goodwin, from the Southern District of West Virginia, sitting by desig-
nation, wrote a thoughtful dissent in Chambers v. Reno, 307 F.3d 284, 293 (4th Cir.
2002) (Goodwin, J., dissenting). There is also a thoughtful opinion by Judge Gleeson
of the Eastern District of New York, in Mohammed v. Reno, 205 F. Supp. 2d 39, 39
(E.D.N.Y. 2002), affd, 309 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2002). Judge Gleeson, however, felt
bound by the Second Circuit's prior opinion in Domond v. LN.S., 244 F.3d 81, 84-89
(2d Cir. 2001) (holding that there were no retroactivity, ex post facto, or equal protec-
tion issues with applying the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act to the
defendant).
46. Laguerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
1153 (2000).
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conviction more vigorously, had they known that if they were
not only imprisoned but also, when their prison term ended, or-
dered deported, they could not ask for a discretionary waiver of
deportation.47
Several years later, another panel backed off of the first part of
this quote and concluded that the petitioner in that case had, in
fact, relied on the state of immigration law at the time of his plea.48
But the second part of the quote stuck. By the end of 2002, seven-
teen courts had quoted Judge Posner, either directly or indirectly,
for the proposition that a criminal defendant relied on the state of
the law when committing a crime and that, therefore, no retroac-
tive effect could be applied.49
Of course, embedded in the LaGuerre quote, and generally un-
acknowledged, was the assumption that a retroactive effect would
only exist if the criminal defendant had relied on immigration con-
sequences when committing a crime. In narrative terms, the
47. Id. at 1041.
48. In Jideonwo v. LN.S., 224 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2000), the Seventh Circuit de-
scribed its reasoning in LaGuerre by saying:
We based this conclusion [of no retroactive effect] on the rationale that "it
would border on the absurd to argue that these aliens might have decided
not to commit drug crimes" had they known they would become ineligible to
receive discretionary relief from deportation. Therefore, we determined that
removing eligibility for discretionary relief in this circumstance would not
attach a new legal consequence to the decision to engage in past conduct.
Id. at 699 (citation omitted). The Jideonwo court proceeded to issue a decision that
recognized the reliance interest in a plea agreement, without acknowledging the con-
flict with LaGuerre. Id. at 699-701. Jideonwo was later discussed in detail by the
Supreme Court in St. Cyr. See I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 323 (2001).
49. Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 102 (2d Cir. 2002); Armendariz-Montoya v.
Sonchik, 291 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2002); Domond v. I.N.S., 244 F.3d 81, 84 (2d
Cir. 2001); Lara-Ruiz v. I.N.S., 241 F.3d 934, 945 (7th Cir. 2001); St. Cyr v. I.N.S., 229
F.3d 406, 418 (2d Cir. 2000), affd, 533 U.S. at 289; Jideonwo, 224 F.3d at 699; Jurado-
Gutierrez v. Greene, 190 F.3d 1135, 1150 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Pala-
ganas-Suarez v. Greene, 529 U.S. 1041 (2000); Turkhan v. Perryman, 188 F.3d 814, 828
(7th Cir. 1999); Evangelista v. Ashcroft, 232 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35-36 (E.D.N.Y. 2002);
Green-Mendoza v. Ashcroft, No. 99 Civ. 9911, 2002 WL 1870285, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 14, 2002); Worrell v. Ashcroft, 207 F. Supp. 2d 61, 68 (W.D.N.Y. 2002); Itur-
ralde-Manosalva v. Reno, No. Civ. 9735, 2001 WL 1398689, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9,
2001); Romero v. Reno, 198 F. Supp. 2d 276, 277 (W.D.N.Y. 2001); Soto v. Ashcroft,
No. Civ. 5986, 2001 WL 1029130, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2001); Lawrence v. I.N.S.,
No. Civ. 2154, 2001 WL 818141, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2001); Herrera v. I.N.S., No.
Civ. 6158, 2000 WL 1349248, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2000); Tam v. Reno, No. C-98-
2835, 1999 WL 163055, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 1999). A few other cases have
quoted Judge Posner and offered criticisms of his rhetoric. See, e.g., Beharry v. Reno,
183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 590 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), rev'd sub. nom Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329
F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2003); Zgombic v. Farquharson, 89 F. Supp. 2d 220, 232 n.10 (D.
Conn. 2000), vacated by No. 00-6165, 2003 WL 21243248 (2d Cir. May 29, 2003).
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LaGuerre court presented the retroactive effect issue as placing the
court at the scene of the crime and placing the spotlight on the
criminal defendant as she revealed the thinking behind the criminal
scheme.5 ° Once posed in this manner, the answer appeared to be
clear: a defendant was unlikely to have structured criminal activi-
ties with a specific reliance on deportation laws. 5' Unlike the de-
fendant agreeing to a plea, the scene of the planning of the crime
included no lawyer advising the defendant on the finer points of
the law, and structuring a deal in light of those consequences. Once
the LaGuerre narrative was accepted as relevant, the conclusion of
no retroactive effect seemed inescapable. 2
But the crucial underlying question was whether the LaGuerre/
Jideonwo court was asking the right question. Is conscious reli-
ance, with a prototype of a lawyer-advised transaction, as recog-
nized in Jideonwo, required for an effect to be retroactive? That is
the essential issue with which so many post-St. Cyr courts have
failed to grapple.
II. IDENTIFYING THE PROPER TEST FOR RETROACTIVE EFFECT
IN CASES INVOLVING WRONGFUL CONDUCT
Underlying the courts' difficulty with finding a proper date by
which to measure retroactivity is the courts' failure to acknowledge
that retroactivity jurisprudence seeks to achieve different goals in
different circumstances.5 3 These different goals shape the judg-
ment of whether any given new consequence is deemed a "new
legal consequence" from the standpoint of retroactivity analysis.54
Without an appreciation of the underlying goals of retroactivity ju-
risprudence, it is difficult to assess what event should be treated as
the trigger date for the presumption against retroactivity.55
The concern in retroactivity cases about protection of reasonable
reliance interests is rooted in cases where the central question is
whether the government should be allowed to upset economic
transactions formulated in light of government rules.56 The para-
digmatic economic-based cases are those concerning tax laws. In
United States v. Carlton, for example, the Court considered the
50. LaGuerre, 164 F.3d at 1041.
51. Id.
52. See id.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 58-80.
54. See infra text accompanying notes 58-80.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 92-109.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 59-66.
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constitutionality of changes in the federal estate tax laws.5 7 Con-
gress had revised the estate tax laws to allow the deduction of sales
of stock to employee stock ownership plans. 58 After these amend-
ments, tax specialists had used the new deductions in ways that
Congress had not intended.5 9 Congress then amended the laws to
limit the use of the deduction and applied the new rules retroac-
tively.60 The question for the Court was whether these new limita-
tions on the deduction were impermissibly retroactive.61 Although
the Court ruled that the new statute was constitutional, it had no
question that the law was retroactive.62 The laws had structured
decisions made by individuals, with the advice of counsel, in a
highly regulated system of economic transactions.
Much of the language of the St. Cyr opinion that centers on the
plea process tracks the way that the Carlton Court thought about
retroactivity. 63 Just as Carlton "was entitled to structure the es-
tate's affairs to comply with tax laws while minimizing tax liabil-
ity,"64 the St. Cyr Court sought to respect the efforts of the
immigrant charged with a crime to minimize the immigration con-
sequences of any plea agreement.65
But while the economic. transaction model dominates in many
retroactivity settings, it is not the only model employed.66 Another
line of reasoning focuses not on what was going through the mind
of the individual, but instead on a variety of fairness concerns, in-
cluding the danger of selective lawmaking against those who are
unpopular.67 In the narrative about an unpopular group, the domi-
nant majority fails to appreciate the unfairness of lawmaking that
changes the consequences of past acts by persons or corporations
that are unpopular or are seen as having acted wrongfully.68 Ret-
57. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 29 (1994).
58. 26 U.S.C. § 2057 (1982).
59. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 28-30.
60. Id. at 29.
61. Id. at 30.
62. Id. at 29.
63. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
64. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 35 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
65. This is clearest in the Court's discussion of the case of Charles Jideonwo,
where it notes that Jideonwo engaged in extensive negotiations with prosecutors with
the sole objective of obtaining a plea that would leave him eligible for relief from
deportation. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 323-24.
66. See Debra Lyn Bassett, In the Wake of Schooner Peggy: Deconstructing Legis-
lative Retroactivity Analysis, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 453, 506-16 (2001) (discussing multi-
ple strands of retroactivity jurisprudence).
67. Id. at 512.
68. Id. at 513 n.342.
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roactivity jurisprudence seeks.to impose a norm of prospective law-
making and stands as a check against easy use of this majority
power to change the consequences of past acts.69 The weakness of
constitutional guarantees limits the courts' role, but it at least
means that Congress must think carefully before it imposes new
consequences on those who are unpopular.70
The check-on-unfair-exercise-of-power-against-the-unpopular
model is illustrated by many of the Court's recent retroactivity
cases. In Landgraf v. USI Film Products,71 for example, the issue
was whether a person who had committed sexual harassment could
be subjected to new damage remedies. 72 In Rivers v. Roadway Ex-
press,73 the Court addressed whether the perpetrator of racial har-
assment would face new damage remedies. 4 In Hughes Aircraft
Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer,75 the issue was whether a com-
pany that had perpetrated a fraud on the government could invoke
defenses to a private qui tam suit that were available at the time of
the fraud, although the defense would never have been available if
the government had initiated the litigation.76 None of these cases
involved a sympathetic plaintiff who was simply trying to follow
the rules and had the rules changed midstream. On the contrary,
each of these plaintiffs had acted illegally under the laws in effect
at the time of the conduct. 77 In each case, the issue presented to
the Court was whether Congress could be allowed to impose new
consequences on past wrongful conduct.78 Given the nature of the
problem, the Court did not focus on a specific transaction that had
the hallmarks of a conscious decision, similar to the lawyer-advised
estate planning in Carlton79 or the lawyer advised plea in Jide-
69. Id. at 513-14.
70. Limiting retroactivity jurisprudence to this kind of clear statement rule, of
course, is of limited comfort to an unpopular group. By definition, it will have a hard
time preventing Congress from expressly authorizing vindictive legislation. See
Daniel Kanstroom, St. Cyr or Insincere: The Strange Quality of Supreme Court Vic-
tory, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 413, 419 (2002).
71. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
72. Id. at 250.
73. 511 U.S. 298 (1994).
74. Id. at 302.
75. 520 U.S. 939 (1997).
76. Id. at 941.
77. Hughes Aircraft Co., 520 U.S. at 942-43; Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 248-49; Rivers,
511 U.S. at 282.
78. Hughes Aircraft Co., 520 U.S. at 942-43; Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 248-49; Rivers,
511 U.S. at 282.
79. See supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text.
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onwo,80 where decisions were specifically made in light of pre-ex-
isting law.
In part, the Court has sought to protect those who are unpopular
in economic cases as well. In Carlton, for example, Justice
O'Connor wrote that the tax planner should not be seen as wrong-
ful because of planning decisions motivated by a desire to avoid
paying taxes.8' Thus, no matter how despised tax planners may be
when they exploit a loophole, they are allowed to rely on the state
of the law. But the critical concern in Carlton was to respect the
fact that tax laws are designed and expected to structure transac-
tions.82 In contrast, when a law imposes a new sanction for conduct
that was wrongful from the start, the purpose of retroactivity juris-
prudence is not to bless past action as appropriate, but to prevent
an unfair imposition of greater consequences for that which was
always wrong.83 Thus, the Court never says that the sexual harass-
ment in Landgraf84 or the racial harassment in Rivers85 were
backed by legitimate expectations (as was the tax planning in Carl-
ton). Instead, it says that the consequences for the wrongful con-
duct in each case should be measured by the law in effect at the
time that the bad act took place.86
Once seen in this light, the plea agreement becomes a very
strange trigger date for retroactivity analysis of the 1996 deporta-
tion laws. The Supreme Court itself recognized in St. Cyr that im-
migrants are an "unpopular group" and, as non-voters, are
particularly vulnerable to adverse legislation.87 This is all the more
true of the persons facing deportation for past crimes, who bear the
mark of being labeled as "criminal aliens."'88 Their wrongful con-
duct is at the heart of why they are targets of the legislation.
In the wrongful conduct context-where the goal of retroactivity
jurisprudence is not to protect transactions but to limit the imposi-
tion of new penalties-the closest analogy are cases involving new
criminal sanctions for conduct that was always criminal.89 In these
80. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
81. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 36 (1994) (quoting Helvering v. Gregory,
69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934)).
82. Id.
83. See id. at 39-40.
84. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
85. Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994).
86. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 35.
87. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 315 n.39 (2001).
88. See id. at 313.
89. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000); Miller v. Florida, 428
U.S. 423 (1987); Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937).
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cases, courts confront an issue very similar to that presented in the
context of new deportation consequences. The underlying conduct
was always illegal, but the consequences of that conduct have
changed. 9°
None of the cases limiting St. Cyr's holding to the plea context
takes account of the long experience with analogous issues in the
context of penal sanctions. In fact, this tradition is rich and very
useful. For example, in Johnson v. United States,91 decided one
year prior to St. Cyr, the Supreme Court confronted the question
of whether a new law on the sanctions following a revocation of
supervised release could be applied to a defendant whose conduct
preceded the change in the law.92 In this case, the change in the
law post-dated the defendant's initial offense and conviction, but
pre-dated the conduct that led to the revocation of his supervised
release.93 A unanimous court 94 ruled that, under the presumption
against retroactive application of new statutes, the new law should
be read as applying only to those persons whose initial offense oc-
curred after the effective date of the new law.95 Nowhere in the
Court's opinion is there any reference to whether the defendant
took a plea or went to trial. Nowhere is there any reference to how
he might have relied on the prior revocation scheme. Instead, the
Court recognizes that the revocation scheme affects the system of
possible punishment for the initial offense and that, as a result, no
new scheme can be applied to a person whose conviction is based
on conduct that pre-dated the change in the law.96
This same rule is found in countless of other criminal cases
where the question of retroactive effect arises under the Ex Post
Facto Clause rather than the clear statement doctrine. In Miller v.
Florida,97 for example, the Court considered whether new sentenc-
ing guidelines could be applied to a defendant.98 The individual's
conduct took place in April 1984; the sentencing guidelines were
proposed in May 1984 and adopted in July 1984. The conviction
was entered in August 1984, and the individual was sentenced in
90. See, e.g., Johnson, 529 U.S. at 694; Miller, 428 U.S. at 423; Lindsey, 301 U.S. at
397.
91. 529 U.S. 694, 702 (2000).
92. Id. at 696.
93. Id. at 697-99.
94. Justice Scalia joined the majority on this point, although he dissented on the
interpretation of the prior law. Id. at 715-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 702.
96. Id. at 700-01.
97. 482 U.S. 423 (1987).
98. Id. at 424-25.
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October 1984.99 The government argued that it was sufficient that
the defendant knew the guidelines at the time of sentencing, and
that he knew at the time of his offense that he would be sentenced
under whatever guidelines were in effect at the time of his sentenc-
ing. 100 The Court rejected this argument.10 1 It concluded that the
new guidelines were more onerous than those in effect at the time
the criminal offense took place and therefore, it would be a retro-
active effect to apply them to the defendant.10 2
Perhaps most relevant to the St. Cyr context is Lindsey v. Wash-
ington, °3 a case that concerned a change in sentencing that took
the prior maximum penalty and made it a mandatory penalty.104
As the St. Cyr Court recognized, Lindsey involved the same kind of
change in consequences at issue in challenges to retroactive appli-
cation of new mandatory deportation rule-changing a maximum
penalty into a mandatory penalty. 5 In Lindsey, the defendant
committed his crime in April 1935.06 Several months later, but
before the government initiated its prosecution, the sentencing law
changed. 107 The Court ruled that it would be an impermissible ret-
roactive effect for Lindsey to be subjected to a more onerous sen-
tencing scheme other than the one in effect at the time of his
crime. o8
The test from these criminal cases is based on a norm that the
government should abide by the rules in effect at the time that a
person engages in conduct, whether or not that conduct is already
proscribed under lesser sanctions.' 1 9 This norm finds its roots in
both principles of good government and in principles of fair no-
tice." 0 Although the constitutional category of the conduct, civil
or criminal, determines the strength with which courts will enforce
a norm of prospectivity, the same norm applies in either context-
99. Id. at 426-27.
100. Id. at 430-31.
101. Id. at 431.
102. Id. at 431-32.
103. 301 U.S. 397 (1937).
104. Id. at 399.
105. Id. at 398-99.
106. State v. Lindsey, 61 P.2d 293, 294 (Wash. 1936), rev'd, 301 U.S. at 398.
107. See Lindsey, 301 U.S. at 398.
108. Id. at 401.
109. See, e.g., id. at 402 (noting that the Constitution prohibits an additional punish-
ment to a previously committed crime where it would be to the disadvantage of the
defendant).
110. See Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 224 (1883) (noting how notice to a defen-
dant of punishment for crime is necessary to legitimacy within the law); see also case
cited infra note 115.
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namely that new penalties should not be imposed for conduct that
pre-dates the imposition of those penalties. 1t
The good government claim is simply that the government en-
genders greater respect for its laws if people can count on the laws
being stable."2 Unlike market expectations, governmental rules
are official statements about what conduct is permissible and what
consequences will flow from a failure to abide by government-is-
sued standards of behavior. Changing rules after the fact thus im-
plicates the rule of law and whether people can count on the
government to play by the standards it has set.113
The fair notice claim is that people should have an opportunity
to modify their conduct in light of the penalties the government
will impose.114 It proceeds not on the idea that it is wrong to
change consequences for a person who consciously structured
criminal acts in light of the penalties, but rather on the idea that
the individual should have had proper warning of the penalties the
government will impose. 15
The difference between a requirement of reliance and a require-
ment of fair notice is subtle. After all, one purpose of notice is to
have the opportunity to change your actions.1 6 Those who have
engaged in unlawful conduct have already failed to act in accor-
dance with laws about which they are presumed to have notice.
Having failed that opportunity, they might be presumed to be unaf-
fected by the lack of notice of other consequences of their wrongful
behavior." 7 This seems to be Judge Posner's point in LaGuerre.18
Retroactivity jurisprudence, though, has never treated those who
engaged in wrongful behavior so harshly. As the Landgraf, Rivers,
111. See Lindsey, 301 U.S. at 401.
112. See Chambers v. Reno, 307 F.3d 284, 296 (4th Cir. 2002) (Goodwin, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1055, 1106 (1997)).
113. See Morawetz, supra note 4, at 136.
114. Chambers, 307 F.3d at 289.
115. See id. at 296 (Goodwin, J., dissenting) (stating "[r]egardless of whether a par-
ticular individual actually relies to his detriment on the legal regime, the government
must at least give individuals the opportunity to know the law and behave
accordingly.").
116. See id. at 290 (discussing defendant's interest in notice of eligibility for relief
factoring into his decision to take a plea agreement).
117. See LaGuerre v. Reno, 164 F.3d 1035, 1041 (1998); see also discussion supra
note 50.
118. See supra text accompanying note 50.
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and Hughes cases illustrate, those who have acted wrongfully are
still provided with protections of fair notice. 119
There are many reasons for a rule of fair notice that goes beyond
proven or inferred reliance. Fair notice, or fair warning, of the con-
sequences of one's actions provides the person with an opportunity
to avoid the actual penalty-not some other more minor pen-
alty. 120 Thus, even if the person would have ignored the increased
penalty, notice makes the higher penalty more fair. 121 It is this
principle of fair warning of actual penalties that underlies the crim-
inal retroactivity caselaw.122 Second, if one of the purposes of ret-
roactivity jurisprudence is to protect those who are singled out for
unpopularity, concepts of fair notice track the actions that make
the group unpopular. 123 In the case of those convicted of crimes,
those actions are likely to be the criminal actions themselves rather
than the actions taken in the course of criminal proceedings.12 4 Fi-
nally, a fair notice rule recognizes that notice can affect action.
Much of the law is premised on the notion that people will respond
to the sanctions the law imposes on wrongful conduct. 125 Thus, the
119. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 946
(1997) (noting a presumption against retroactive legislation); Rivers v. Roadway Ex-
press, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 310-14 (1994) (discussing retroactivity and holding that the
act does not apply to pre-enactment conduct); Landgrad v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S.
244, 270 (1994) (discussing retroactivity and fair notice).
120. See Morawetz, supra note 4, at 135-36 (discussing the concept of fair warning
of the consequences of one's actions).
121. See id.
122. See, e.g., Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981) (discussing the ex post
facto prohibition and fair notice).
123. See Morawetz, supra note 4, at 146-47 (discussing the unfair targeting of un-
popular groups through retroactive legislation).
124. The same conclusion follows from Professor Chin's article for this symposium.
As he argues, the civil label for a collateral consequence depends on the legislative
purpose being geared to persons who have engaged in some conduct that makes that
group undesirable. Otherwise, the legislature's actions should be seen as penal and,
therefore, subject to more rigorous constitutional tests. Even if this view is rejected
on the ground that the conviction may properly be used as easy proof of the conduct,
the underlying argument stands that civil collateral consequences depend on a legisla-
tive purpose that is conduct-oriented. Thus, when imposed retroactively, a clear state-
ment should be required for changing consequences of past conduct and not simply
those of plea agreements. Gabriel Chin, Are Collateral Sanctions Premised on Con-
duct or Conviction?: The Case of Abortion Doctors, 30 FOROHAM URB. L.J. 1685,
1699-1700 (2003).
125. See Robert Kaatz, Is There an Ex Post Facto Prohibition on Judicial Decisions
that Retroactively Enlarge Criminal Punishment?, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 1367, 1381
(2002) (stating that defendants often rely on expected punishment when deciding
their plea). But see Danny Stevenson, To Whom is the Law Addressed?, 21 YALE L.
& POI'Y REV. 105, 158 (2003) (arguing that the ex post facto rule is not to provide
notice, and does not, but is to "discourage private bullying by the government.").
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degree of a consequence (for example, mandatory deportation)
might affect underlying action, even if lesser penalties failed to
have that effect. Indeed, theories of deterrence in criminal justice
are based on the assumption that penalties can affect action.12 6 So,
while Judge Posner's rhetoric was powerful, it is quite plausible
that people who have broken the law would have acted differently
if they had known that their wrongful conduct would carry ex-
tremely serious penalties.127
CONCLUSION
Retroactivity jurisprudence is a powerful potential tool to pro-
tect those with criminal convictions from collateral conse-
quences. 128 The power of that tool, however, might be diminished
by the courts' overly narrow reading of the appropriate trigger date
for measuring retroactivity. 29 At this stage, Judge Posner's rheto-
ric from LaGuerre3 ° has taken on such a life of its own that it may
be difficult for courts to abandon the reliance test in judging retro-
active effect. But when measured against other cases in which new
consequences were imposed for past wrongful conduct and when
thought of in terms of the broader goals of retroactivity jurispru-
dence, there is little analytic support for the judicial assumption
that retroactivity only protects the reliance-backed planning deci-
sions of immigrants with criminal convictions.' 3'
126. See Stevenson, supra note 125, at 158-67 (discussing the role of deterrence in
criminal justice).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 31 & 36.
128. See case cited supra note 5 and accompanying text.
129. See cases cited supra note 9 and accompanying text.
130. See supra text accompanying note 50.
131. See, e.g., case cited supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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